

AN APPLICATION OF CONTENT ANALYSIS TO
THE BUDGETARY BEHAVIOR OF THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Larry Wayne Blackmon

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

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THE BUDGETARY BEHAVIOR OF THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

by

Larry Wayne Blackmon

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Thesis Advisor:

E. J. Laurance

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An Application of Content Analysis to
the Budgetary Behavior of the
Senate Armed Services Committee

by

Larry Wayne Blackmon
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., Naval Postgraduate School, 1973

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I. INTRODUCTION

The research effort and methodology embodied in this thesis were directed towards analyzing the budgetary behavior of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). The specific area of interest was the annual authorization of appropriations for Defense Procurement. The analysis covers the period fiscal year 1968 through fiscal year 1974, and the primary research method was that of Content Analysis (CA).

Examination of the SASC was undertaken for two reasons. First, during the past several years the size and content of the Defense portion of the Federal budget has been the target of increasing criticism, scrutiny and challenge from both congressional and non-congressional sources. This critical atmosphere has resulted in an expanded awareness of the number and magnitude of sophisticated, high-cost weapons systems being developed and procured by the Department of Defense (DOD).

A direct adjunct of the above environment has been an increased effort to insure better requirements definition and program management on the part of the DOD components. The annual authorization hearings have thus become the primary setting in which the services, via program or project managers and/or their staffs, must justify their programs. Hence, it is necessary to understand the functioning and interests

of the committees before which the service representatives must testify.

The second reason this particular committee was chosen follows from the first. The majority of efforts, which have focused on examining congressional oversight of the budgetary process, have been directed towards the appropriations committees of the two houses, or to Congress as a whole. As a result, there is a noticeable paucity of information pertaining to the singular characteristics of the SASC. As will be shown below, this committee has exhibited an increasing interest in service programs and a definite concern with management aspects relating to cost control. Perhaps even more important is the potential this committee retains for influencing major defense programs and overall defense policy.

Research design and methodology centered on the content analysis of explicit decision behavior. The approach to analysis and the pertinent findings are discussed in section V. Finally, the concluding section contains recommendations for further study.

Implicit in this research is the assumption that the reader has a thorough understanding of the annual budgetary process. For this reason, a lengthy, detailed explanation of the budgetary process, per se, was purposely omitted. The reader is referred to the bibliography for sources of reference as necessary.

II. BACKGROUND

A. HYPOTHESES DEFINITION

The major thrust of this thesis was directed towards an analysis of the budgetary behavior of the Senate Armed Services Committee. More specifically, using the Content Analysis approach, an effort was made to determine whether the committee has exhibited a predominately fiscal or programmatic tendency in their consideration of the annual authorization requests.

The definition of Fiscal and Programmatic behavior was basic to the investigation. In a recent article in Naval War College Review, Professor Lawrence J. Korb set forth the relevant definitions that provided a basis for reference [Ref. 12].

The two hypotheses are opposing in nature. For example, the Fiscal hypothesis holds that Congress approaches the Defense budget with a goal of eliminating waste and increasing managerial effectiveness. The result is a congressional tendency to make percentage or across-the-board reductions in the budget. The desired goal is to reduce the overall level of defense spending and reductions are made without consideration of the effects on overall program composition.

On the other hand, the Programmatic hypothesis contends that, in fact, Congress is less concerned with total spending and more concerned with individual programs. The end result of this type of behavior would be to shape defense

programs, strengthen the force structure, determine the types and numbers of weapons systems, etc. Moves to influence programs or related areas would thus be based on policy motives, and should reflect an attempt, by Congress or the committee concerned, to impose its "imprint" on National Defense viz-z-viz the authorization process.

B. SURVEY OF LITERATURE

There are numerous studies which have been directed towards analyzing Congressional spending behavior. The approaches which have been employed are equally varied. Congress has been examined as a whole in an effort to determine their impact on spending. There have been several in-depth studies, using quantitative techniques, the goal of which was to establish stable patterns of behavior and furnish a predictive tool to assess future orientations. Finally, some studies have focused on sociological and structural characteristics of the various committees in an effort to explain congressional activity. The studies cited below are presented in an effort to orient the reader to various approaches and conclusions with respect to the Fiscal-Programmatic dilemma. The material is intended to provide a limited review of literature that might be used as a starting point for further research and additional information on Congressional behavior.

1. The Fiscal Hypothesis

Lawrence Korb, in "Congressional Impact on Defense Spending, 1962 - 1973: The Programmatic and Fiscal Hypothesis,"

examined Congressional changes to the Defense portion of the Federal budget on an aggregate level. Korb used a comparative approach and cited four measures or standards that were used to gauge the fiscal impact of Congressional activity; the five per cent standard of significance suggested by Richard Fenno [Ref. 7, p. 353]; the historical impact of Congress prior to 1962; the impact of the executive branch (those reductions made by Secretary of Defense and the President); and the impact of Congress in the non-defense areas of the Federal budget [Ref. 12, p. 51].

Korb's examination was centered around a breakdown of the Department of Defense budget into separate appropriation titles, (Personnel, O&M, Procurement, RDT&E). He then examined the magnitude of Congressional changes to the budget request within these titles and applied Fenno's five per cent measure of significance.

Korb concluded that the fiscal impact of Congress was less than significant until 1970. From 1970 until 1973 there is evidence of increasing Congressional interest and activity and during this period the fiscal impact was significant. For example, during the period FY 1970-FY 1973 Congress reduced the defense spending on an average of 5.35% [Ref. 12, p. 53].

The programmatic impact was considered to be more "shadow than substance." The primary reasons for this conclusion were that, although activity from FY 1962 to FY 1973 was concentrated primarily in the Procurement and RDT&E

titles, Congress (1) seldom cancelled a weapon system and (2) chose to concentrate activity within these areas because of political feasibility [Ref. 12, p. 59,60].

Similar conclusions were reached by Carol F. Goss. In her dissertation, Goss stipulated that Congressional influence on procurement could be examined at three different levels -- procedural, fiscal and substantive [Ref. 8, p. 356]. Taken here, Goss' procedural and fiscal levels coincide with the Fiscal hypothesis, and actions at the substantive level are considered to be programmatic in nature. She examined decision making structure and behavior within the appropriations and authorizations committees, among others, and concluded that "participation in substantive policy ... has been intermittent and, by and large, not very effective," [Ref. 8, p. 404]. Hence, her research tends to support the fiscal hypothesis for Congressional activity during the late sixties.

Richard Fenno's definitive work, The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress, was directed primarily at a study of non-defense budget activity at an aggregate level [Ref. 7]. The thrust of Fenno's findings was that Congress acts in a fiscal or incremental manner towards non-defense spending.

In a thesis entitled An Analysis of the Budgetary Behavior of the House Appropriations Committee on Defense Procurement [Ref. 14], Leo A. Lukenas examined specific committee behavior and addressed the fiscal-programmatic controversy. His findings supported the fiscal orientation.

He concluded that the direction of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee behavior, during the period FY 1970 to FY 1973, was fiscal in nature. Lukenas points to the fact that committee action was primarily oriented towards program progress and costs, thereby supporting the Korb and Goss findings [Ref. 14, p. 44-47]. He did, however, note that the role played by the authorizing committees showed an increasingly programmatic orientation during this period.

Further support for the fiscal hypothesis was given by Wildavsky, Davis and Dempster [Ref. 4]. In "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," 56 non-defense agencies of the U.S. Government were examined. An effort was made to establish a mathematical model which would explain Congressional decision-making within various committees as they reviewed agency requests. Their research suggests that Congressional actions result in aggregate decisions which closely follow simple linear models that are stable over time. Further, participants in the budgetary process use "aids" which are primarily "incremental" in nature. Additionally, they hold that decision-makers tend to think in terms of percentage reductions.

2. The Programmatic Hypothesis

The literature cited thus far has revealed primary evidence that Congress approaches the Federal budget with the intent of reducing spending. This is accomplished either by across-the-board reductions or selected "cuts" in politically expedient areas. There are those, however, who support the opposite or programmatic view.

Professor Edward J. Laurance, in his doctoral dissertation, examined the changing role of Congress in defense policy-making [Ref. 13]. His in-depth study pointed to a definite change from a "rubber-stamp" Congress, during the period 1947 to 1967, to a Congress more concerned with policy and issues during the 1967 - 1971 time frame. He contends that this transformation was "systemic" in nature and alludes to the idea that this has resulted in changes which point to a more programmatic or policy motivated Congress. This is especially true with respect to the SASC. As support for these findings, Laurance includes evidence such as: (1) decreased "rubber-stamp" activity on defense issues, (2) "budget shaping" during committee debates on defense policy, (3) increased length of hearings on the part of SASC, which include strategic and structural issues, and (4) increased floor debate and amendments during the Senate authorization process [Ref. 13, p. 126].

Still another proponent of the programmatic hypothesis is Arnold Kanter. Kanter's extensive quantitative analysis, "Congress and the Defense Budget: 1960 - 1970," challenges the inference that, because studies in non-defense areas have shown a fiscal approach on the part of Congress, this approach is equally applied to defense areas. Therefore, he orients his study toward the defense authorization and appropriations process. Specifically, Kanter's analysis focused on the floor action in both the House and Senate during defense debates. The information derived was compared

to appropriation outcomes and formed the basis for the study. His conclusion was that, of the two approaches to explaining budgetary activity in the defense area, the Congress exhibits both a programmatic and fiscal orientation. However, he feels that the programmatic explanation has the greatest significance for defense policy [Ref. 11].

C. BACKGROUND SUMMARY

The above cited references suggest areas for further research. Specifically, there is a noticeable lack of specific committee analysis, with the exception of Defense appropriations. There are several instances where cursory discussion is directed towards the role of the Armed Services committees. As a whole, however, the research dwells on aggregate or overall levels of the budget, the Congress as an entity, and activity in non-defense areas of the Federal budget.

Of specific importance is the fact that it is generally conceded that the Congress as a body accepts the "expertise" of, and generally follows, the recommendations of the four major military committees that are involved with defense authorizations and appropriations, (House and Senate Armed Services, House and Senate Appropriations). "Specialization is a virtue nurtured by committees and subcommittees, and specialization and attention to detail are highly regarded in Congress," [Ref. 2, p. 149, 150]. The military committees are recognized as being the most influential in military affairs and policy, and some have stated that the authorizing

committees have the greatest potential for influencing defense programs and policy [Ref. 2, p. 150; Ref. 8, p. 368]. It was primarily for these reasons and weaknesses that this thesis concentrated on the SASC.

III. THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE AND CONGRESS

Fundamental to any understanding of the SASC is a brief examination of committee origin, structure, and a cursory review of the growth in committee power and influence.

A. GENERAL .

In 1945, as a response to expanding governmental power and ill-defined Congressional relationships, the Lafollette Committee submitted recommendations calling for a reorganization of the Congress. The Lafollette recommendations provided the basis for the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Among other things, this Act provided for a reduction in the number of standing committees in Congress. Within the Senate, the Naval Affairs and Military Affairs Committees, were consolidated to form the Committee on Armed Services. This Committee was charged, in broad terms, with jurisdiction over areas of common defense and the armed forces in general.

B. MEMBERSHIP

Table I is an historical review of the committee membership during the period of this research. As reflected in the table, the number of members, which is determined by the Senate, has remained fairly constant. Additionally, the membership of the six ranking majority members and three of the four minority members has remained unchanged since 1967. Finally, the overall turnover rate during this period

TABLE I
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP
(1967 - 1973)

	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73
Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.)	*	*	*	*			
John Stennis (D-Miss.)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Stuart Symington (D-Mo.)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Sam J. Erwin, Jr. (D-N.C.)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Howard W. Cannon (D-Nev.)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Robt. C. Byrd (D-W.Va.)	*	*					
Stephen M. Young (D-Ohio)	*	*	*	*			
Daniel K. Inouye (D-Haw.)	*	*	*	*			
Thom. J. McIntyre (D-N.H.)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Daniel B. Brewster (D-Md.)	*	*					
Harry F. Byrd (D-Vermont)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Margaret C. Smith (R-Me.)	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Jack Miller (R-Iowa)	*	*					
John G. Tower (R-Tex.)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
James B. Pearson (R-Kans.)	*	*					
Peter H. Dominick (R-Colo.)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
George Murphy (R-Calif.)			*	*			
Ed. W. Brooke (R-Mass.)			*	*	*	*	*
Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.)			*	*	*	*	
Harold Hughes (D-Iowa)					*	*	
Lloyd M. Rentsen (D-Tex.)					*	*	
Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)			*	*	*	*	*
William B. Saxbe (R-Ohio)					*	*	*
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)							*
Wm. Lloyd Scott (R-Va.)							*

(Data from: Congressional Directory, GPO, Wash., D.C., 1967-1973.)

averaged 7.4%. This low turnover has provided a base for continuity, increased committee expertise and, further provides an indication of the desirability of committee membership. One possible explanation for this relative committee stability is the seniority ranking of the SASC. At the time of this writing the average committee seniority, in years of Senate service, was 13.8 years.¹

C. SASC AND THE AUTHORIZATIONS PROCESS

It is within the authorizations arena that the SASC displays the greatest potential for shaping defense policy or influencing specific program outcomes. As mentioned above, the four "military committees" are the most influential in altering the Defense budget. During the annual authorizing and appropriations process, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees must review the administration's defense requests, item-by-item, and establish the limits within which appropriations must fall.² Therefore, the Armed Services Committees have the legislative wherewithal to constrain the Appropriations Committees and to cancel or change the direction of individual defense programs as desired. However, as will be shown below, the realities of the Congressional process do not reflect a major assertion of this power.

¹ Seniority data extracted from An Analysis of the Senate Armed Services Committee, CDR L.C. Eastman, et. al., NPGS Paper, 1974.

² For an excellent discussion of the fiscal/budgetary process see W.C. Ruckert, Fiscal and Life Cycles of the Defense Systems.

The potential of the SASC, in the area of Procurement and RDT&E, may be easily demonstrated in terms of New Obligational Authority. Figure 1 is a comparative breakdown of New Budget authority recommended for the FY 1968 and 1974 budgets. For Procurement, \$22.9 billion and \$18.8 billion were recommended for 1968 and 1974 respectively. Of these amounts 60 per cent required authorization in FY 1968 and 71 per cent required SASC approval in FY 1974. Thus, today the role, or at least the potential role, of the SASC is manifestly one of power. This was not always the case.

NOA COMPARISON

FY	New Budget Authority Recommended for DOD	NOA Recommended for Procurement	NOA Requiring Authorization
1968	\$74.7 B	\$22.9 B	\$13.8 B (60%)
1974	\$83.5 B	\$18.8 B	\$13.4 B (71%)

NOA = New Obligational Authority

(Source, The Budget, FY 1968, FY 1974)

Figure 1

D. THE CHANGING PERSPECTIVE

The role the SASC played, during its first fifteen years of legislative oversight, was essentially one of scrutinizing requests for military construction. Authorizations in this area were closely watched and completed on a line item basis. It was during this period (1946 - 1961) that the Armed Services Committees of both houses of Congress were known as the "real estate" committees. Until the late

fifties, the SASC merely reviewed plans for developing and procuring weapons systems. Authorizations for these areas were made on a continuing basis and it was the Appropriations Committees who actually authorized and appropriated funds for specific military programs.

The involvement of the SASC has changed in recent years. From 1959 to present there has been a steady expansion of power within the Armed Services Committee in the area of Procurement and RDT&E. The fountainhead of this expansion was the introduction of the Russell Amendment during consideration of the FY 1960 Military Construction bill. This amendment, designated Section 412 (b), was a deliberate attempt to alter the balance of power in Congress with respect to budgetary control. The amendment was policy-oriented and specifically directed towards the area of defense weapons programs [Ref. 5, p. 42]. As incorporated in the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal 1960, Senator Russell's rider called for expanding the role of the Armed Services Committee such that:

"No funds may be appropriated after December 31, 1960, to or for use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels unless the appropriation of such funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after such date." [Ref. 15]

Subsequent amendments and passage of Public laws have expanded the original Section 412 (b) to include required authorization for appropriations in the following areas:

- 1) "... all research, development, test, or evaluation carried on by the Department of Defense." [Ref. 16]
- 2) "... for the procurement of tracked combat vehicles." [Ref. 17]
- 3) "... personnel strengths of each of the Selected Reserves of the Reserve components..." [Ref. 18]
- 4) "... for the procurement of other weapons to or for the use of any armed force of the United States." [Ref. 19]
- 5) "... for the use of the Navy for the procurement of torpedoes and related support equipment..." [Ref. 20]

Thus, the increased scope of the SASC was seen as an attempt to open the door to a more active role in shaping defense policy. Raymond H. Dawson held that this role was made possible by (1) more utility of focus, a narrower examination of defense programs by the Armed Services Committee as opposed to the wide range of line-items examined by Appropriations Committees; (2) a greater access by the committee to Defense issues and conflicts within the DOD; and (3) as a result of (1) and (2) an expanded base of knowledge, whereby the Committee could gain increased expertise and knowledge in heretofore "closed" areas of National Security [Ref. 5, p. 301,302]. Whether or not this increased activity in the program or policy areas, has been realized is a point to be discussed below.

E. SUBCOMMITTEES AND STAFFS

It is difficult to assess the role played by the subcommittees and their staffs within the authorizations process.

Indeed, it is suggested that such an assessment could well be the subject of an independent research effort. There are, however, certain conclusions that may be inferred from explicit facts pertinent to these areas.

First, as is evident from an examination of Table II, the proliferation of subcommittees of the SASC is impressive. From two subcommittees in 1967, the number has grown to a total of twelve in 1974. The total number reached a peak of 14 in 1972.

The parent committee is responsible for creating the necessary subcommittees to conduct hearings, inquiries and investigations required to augment the Committee's legislative function. Thus, since the SASC is primarily concerned with programs of a military nature, it can be inferred that subcommittee expansion was a manifest result of increased activity and scrutiny by the SASC in the area of military authorizations.

During this same time frame, the number of professional staff members increased from nine in 1967, to 26 in 1973 [Ref. 1]. This increase might be explained as the result of two associated events. First, the increased number of subcommittees would almost certainly result in increased administrative, research and investigative requirements, thereby necessitating additional staff augmentation. Secondly, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 changed the number of permanent professional staffs for standing committees and authorized the hiring of temporary consultants [Ref. 3].

TABLE II

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE: SUBCOMMITTEE HISTORY

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74
<u>Subcommittee</u>								
1. Subcommittee on Preparedness Investigation	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
2. Subcommittee on Central Intelligence Agency	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
3. Subcommittee on National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserve		*	*	*	*	*	*	*
4. Subcommittee on Status of Forces		*	*	*	*	*	*	*
5. Subcommittee on Military Construction		*	*	*	*	*	*	*
6. Subcommittee SALT					*	*	*	*
7. Subcommittee Nuc. Test Ban Treaty					*	*	*	*
8. Subcommittee on R & D					*	*	*	*
9. Subcommittee on Tactical Air Power					*	*	*	*
10. Subcommittee on General Legislation					*	*	*	*
11. Subcommittee AX/Cheyenne (Close Air Support)					*	*	*	*
12. Subcommittee on Reprogramming of Funds					*	*	*	*
13. Subcommittee on Drug Abuse in Armed Services					*	*	*	*
14. Subcommittee on Center for Naval Analysis					*	*		
NUMBER OF SUBCOMMITTEES	2	4	5	5	11	14	12	12

(Based on data from: Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Congress, Government Printing Office, 1971; Congressional Directory, 1967 - 1974, GPO, Wash., D.C.; Charles Brownson, Congressional Staff Directory, 1967 - 1974.)

The actual impact of the Congressional Staff on policy, which is almost certain to be of significance, will not be assessed in this thesis.

IV. APPROACH TO ANALYSIS

A. METHODOLOGY

Once the area of research had been reduced to an examination of the SASC and their budgetary behavior, it was then necessary to consider the design for research. Various schemes were considered but the most suitable seemed to be that of content analysis (CA).

Content analysis is by no means a new approach to objective investigation. Articles pertaining to the use of CA date back to the early forties. However, since the bulk of the background on CA was obtained from Holsti, it is his general statement that is considered germane; "... content analysis is the application of scientific methods to documentary evidence," [Ref. 9, p. 5]. Specific examples of the application of this method may be found in works by Sharkansky [Ref. 22] and Jernberg [Ref. 10].

Basically, the methodology used herein followed a research design similar to that put forth by Holsti [Ref. 9, p. 26]. The objective was to draw conclusions as to motives behind communicated messages in an effort to determine pre-dominate committee behavior. The overall effort involved (1) identification of documentary material that was held to represent an accurate, explicit indication of committee behavior, (2) isolation of some unit of analysis that could be categorized for further analysis, (3) development of

appropriate categories for use with the unit of analysis and (4) inferences based on the above processes.

B. SOURCE DOCUMENTS

The bulk of the analysis concentrated on data extracted from the Reports of the Senate Committee on Armed Services for defense authorizations during the period of FY 1968 to FY 1974 [Refs. 23-29]. These documents were chosen for the below cited reasons:

1. Document Importance

As is generally accepted, the Congress as a whole is time-constrained. It is therefore reasonable to assume that, in the area of Procurement authorizations, the Senate has neither the time nor resources to devote to an in-depth review of several volumes of hearings. If it is further assumed that the decision-making process, which culminates in a chamber vote, is rational then it may be concluded that the published Reports of the various committees serve as primary reference documents for non-committee members of the Senate. Additionally, the Senate has exhibited a marked tendency to accept SASC recommendations for Defense Authorizations.³ These two arguments led to the decision to draw the "units of analysis" from the Report.

³ During the period examined, the final Senate passed authorization was the same as that recommended by the SASC 71% of the time. FY 1972 and FY 1974 were exceptions.

2. Document Brevity

Time constraints and research resources also favored the use of the Report. Whereas the published testimony of the hearings before the SASC consisted of several volumes of considerable length, the Report involves only a single document which appears to capsulize the important "decisions" made during the hearings.

3. Document Accessibility

Finally, the Reports are maintained as part of the aggregate government documents at any official depository. As such, they are readily accessible for reference.

In addition to Senate Reports, the Congressional Quarterly Almanac was of considerable value. The Almanac was used to answer questions relating to final authorization amounts, appropriations and to resolve issues that were vague or ambiguous in the Report.

C. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

A survey of CA literature and applications affirms the fact that much of the inventiveness of the technique used necessarily depends on the document and the analyst. However, Holsti contends that the vast majority of CA works have utilized one of five major units of analysis for coding [Ref. 9, p. 116, 177]. Of the five he discusses, the unit most descriptive of the work herein would be the "theme."

Taken here, the theme was the context or explicit reason surrounding the unit of analysis that was finally coded. After examining recorded themes or statements in the Reports,

it was possible to make an assertion as to the motives or circumstances underlying the actions of the committee and assign each action or "decision" to an appropriate category as described below.

Once the appropriate Reports were obtained, it was necessary to examine the contents and isolate the final unit of analysis for coding. Following an initial survey of the Reports, it became obvious that the "decision" was the appropriate unit to be used. It was then necessary to define "decision" and develop category boundaries for coding the data in question.

1. Unit of Analysis

For the purposes of this research, a "decision" was considered to be those actions which met the following criteria.

a) Recommendations in reference to major weapons programs as expressed in the discussion sections of the Reports. (e.g. The areas addressed under the heading of "Committee Actions and Views," FY '68, '69, '70, '71 and "Aspects of Bill of Special Interest," FY '72, '73, '74.) These recommendations involved approvals, deletions and transfers of money between titles.

b) Changes in dollar amounts (+ and -) as reflected in the line items or elements of tables within the Reports. (e.g. Title - Procurement, Line Item - Army Aircraft, Element - AH-56 Cheyene, \$-12.0 Million.)

It is pointed out that the recommendations discussed under "Views" or "Special Interest" were considered to be decisions even though, in some cases, no dollar changes were involved. Additionally, all changes and discussions relating to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) program were purposely omitted. Finally, the Southeast Asia Amendment, considered in the FY 1973 Report, was not considered germane and therefore was omitted from the analysis.

Those actions which met the above criteria and exceptions were recorded and considered to be explicit indications of Committee behavior and interests.

2. Category Development

Perhaps the most important part of the CA methodology is that of category definition and refinement. Holsti [Ref. 9] was used almost exclusively for reference in this area. The categories serve the purpose of guiding the analyst and coder and must provide a means for placement of the units of analysis.

Category definitions must meet two major criteria. They must be both valid and precise. Validity is essential in order to accurately reflect the analyst's concepts and allow bias-free coding of the author's concepts. Precision is necessary to allow independent coding of the units under investigation based on the judgment of the coding personnel.

Further restrictions on category construction involve the application of tests of exhaustiveness, mutual exclusiveness and independence [Ref. 9, ch. 5].

a) Exhaustive Categories. Definition should be such that all data examined is capable of being placed into one of the categories defined.

b) Mutually Exclusive Categories. Definition should be such that the coder is guided to place data into only one of the categories in use.

c) Independence. Coding of data in a single category should not influence the classification of other data.

V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A. ANALYSIS

After the basic research criteria were established, analysis was begun. The analysis consisted of five sequential stages. In order of completion it involved initial data recording, category definition, decision coding, pretesting and category refinement, and data reduction.

1. Initial Data Recording

An in-depth examination of the procurement section of each Senate Report was completed. During this process changes and recommendations, which were considered to represent "decisions" as defined above, were recorded on worksheets. The theme, or information pertinent to the decision, was also recorded. This included the amount of change involved, major weapon program or equipment affected and, wherever possible, key words and phrases which appeared to represent explicit reasons underlying Committee action. Much emphasis was placed on this stage of the analysis in order to gain an overall appreciation for the "context" of the actions as well as familiarity with content. This was a necessary preface to category definition and further analysis.

2. Category Definition

Through use of the criteria of mutual exclusiveness, independence and exhaustiveness, and key words and phrases associated with the recorded decision, eleven categories

covering both Fiscal and Programmatic behavior were defined. The initial set of definitions were intended to allow "coding", or assignment of each decision to a single category. Eventually, the original eleven categories were reduced to the three broad categories and appropriate subcategories as defined below. Figure 2 schematically depicts the process of category reduction and the final results.

a. Programmatic Category

This category included those decisions that reflected Committee efforts to shape defense programs or specific weapons systems to conform to policy views or desired Committee goals viz-a-viz National Defense. Decisions in this category were coded under one of the following subcategories.

(1) Developmental. Those changes to programs as a result of the following types of action: premature requests for procurement (development incomplete); problems referred to as "technical," "developmental," "redesign," etc.; express committee desire for additional development; schedule slippage resulting from technical/developmental difficulties.

(2) Military Programs. Those changes to, or approval of, funds requests associated with the following reasons: force modernization or expressed desire for technically improving equipment considered obsolete or inadequate to meet a threat; actions specifically referred to as strategic in nature or associated with efforts to improve

CATEGORY REFINEMENT

(Original Categories)

DOD	FP	FM	SP	TP	DEV	CE	PM	IR	NR	FI
DOD	FP	MILITARY PROGRAMS				DEV				
OTHER			PROGRAMMATIC							
							FISCAL			

(Final categories and subcategories)

DOD - DOD Action	CE - Cost Effectiveness
FP - Foreign Policy	PM - Program Management
FM - Force Modernization	IR - Incorrect Request
SP - Strategic Programs	NR - No Reason
TP - Tactical Programs	FI - Fiscal
DEV - Developmental	

Figure 2

strategic programs, (e.g. manned bomber, ICBM, FBM, NORAD); actions motivated by or initiated to meet an opposing tactical threat, (e.g. fighter superiority, fleet air defense, missile defense).

(3) Foreign Policy. Those changes to, or approval of, funds requests associated with actions such as: expressed concern for possible or actual effects of defense policy as related to international treaties, commitments, alliances or perceived role of United States in international context; efforts directed towards maintaining an independent technology base.

b. Fiscal Category

This category included those decisions which were clearly not associated with defense policy or program goals. The major effort or goal of these actions would be directed towards a reduction in defense spending. The below defined subcategories were used.

(1) Incorrect Requests. Those funds requests that were considered by the Committee to be under the wrong title, line item or element.

(2) No Reason. The analysis assumed a "worst case" and if no reason for change was given the decision was coded as fiscal.

(3) Management Oriented. Those actions associated with efforts aimed at achieving the following results: improving overall management of specific programs; reducing cost growth within a particular program; prohibiting system

duplication; implementing express management policy; reducing reprogramming actions; maintaining production or technology base.

(4) Cost Effectiveness. Changes to, or approval of, funds requests associated with those actions that: increased a specific capability for reduced program costs; reduced costs with no perceived decrease in capability; directed use of comparable system components for same mission; encouraged multilateral service procurement of similar equipment; reduced requests due to "limited capability" of associated equipment.

c. Other

Those changes or recommendations resulting from expressed views by Secretary Defense, Service Chiefs, Service Secretaries or the "Services." Generally included in this category are reduced or revised "requirements" and program cancellations. This was originally coded as DOD action.

3. Data Coding

Using the eleven original categories, as depicted in Figure 2, the decisions listed in Appendix A were coded or assigned to a category. Assignment was based on the category definition which most closely coincided with the explicit language or reasons given for the change. Although the final category and subcategory definitions above differ somewhat from the original, the essence of the overall definitions are intact.

4. Pretesting and Category Refinement

Once the decisions were recorded and coded using the original eleven category definitions it was necessary to test the validity of the effort. This was accomplished by means of an independent pretest.

A person disassociated with the research was briefed on the objectives of the thesis, the method to be used for coding, original category definitions and the material from which the decisions were extracted. The coder was then asked to choose a minimum of twenty-five random decisions from the list in Appendix A. Using the page reference, the Senate Reports and the eleven category definitions, he was asked to code the selected decisions.

In all, thirty-two decisions were coded during the pretest. The results were then compared to the decisions coded by the author in order to ascertain the percentage of agreement. The raw results indicated agreement in fifteen of the thirty-two decisions compared. This equated to 47 per cent.

In each case where the two coding efforts were not in consonance, the author reviewed the decision and original category assignment. In four cases the original coding was considered in error and changed to agree with the independent effort. This review resulted in a new level of agreement of 57 per cent.

Finally, category refinement was undertaken. This was necessary in order to arrive at two general categories

which would allow a Fiscal and Programmatic dichotomy to be drawn. The refinement has been illustrated in Figure 2 and consisted of using subcategorization as a means of expanding two basic definitions. Once the refinement process was complete, the coding could be accomplished using Fiscal, Programmatic and Other as the basic categories.

Using the final general categories, a third comparison of the original coding and the pretest results was made. The agreement level increased to seventy-one per cent. The marked increase was attributed to the expanded definition parameters, and was also considered to be a more accurate representation of category validity.

B. DATA REDUCTION AND FINDINGS

Once the decisions had been recorded and category assignments made, Appendix A was completed. All decisions used in the analysis, the service branch and equipment involved, the amount of change and the appropriate page number of the Senate Report were recorded for reference. Additionally, each decision was coded using the initial eleven categories and the final three as described above. The findings that follow, along with the attendant tabular and graphical data, were in large part drawn from Appendix A.

1. Fiscal vs. Programmatic Behavior Within the SASC

The major effort of this thesis, as stated at the beginning, was directed towards an attempt to discern whether or not the SASC has exhibited a predominately Fiscal or Programmatic behavior when addressing the annual Defense

Authorization request. The following findings are offered in response to that objective.

Table III is the numerical tally of the actions, or decisions, as coded in Appendix A. Based on the resulting totals, Figure 3 was constructed in order to reflect the overall weight of each subcategory and give an indication of the percentage of actions which were considered Fiscal, Programmatic and Other.

As reflected in Table III and Figure 3, the total number of actions within the various subcategories was 165. Of this number 88 were coded Fiscal (subcategory IR + PM + CE + FI). This yielded an overall Fiscal percentage of 53.3.. The corresponding total of those decisions coded as Programmatic (subcategory FP + DEV + FM + SP + TP) was 57. This total equated to 34.6 per cent of those actions examined. The remainder of the decisions, 20, were coded as DOD under Other. Thus, the predominant behavior, when examined as total decisional activity, appeared to be Fiscal in nature.

Figure 4 graphically illustrates the data recorded in Table III and was constructed to determine trends of activity, by Fiscal year, during the period examined. It is important to note two characteristics reflected in this graph. First, the peaks of activity in FY 1971 and FY 1974 tend to make the overall percentage of actions greater. However, if one examines Programmatic activity, by Fiscal year, the picture of Fiscal predominance is somewhat diminished. Indeed, the Fiscal action is greater in only four of the seven years examined.


TABLE III
DECISION ENUMERATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>DOD</u>	<u>FP</u>	<u>DEV</u>	<u>FM</u>	<u>SP</u>	<u>TP</u>	<u>IR</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>CE</u>	<u>FI</u>	<u>Totals</u>
1968		1									1
1969			1		1	1			1	1	5
1970	4	1	5		1				4	4	19
1971	2		5	2		2	2	5	2	18	38
1972	5	1	2		3	4		5	1	3	24
1973	2		6	2	2	1		10		3	26
1974	7		10	3	3			7	6	16	52
Totals	20	3	29	7	10	8	2	27	14	45	165

(Table derived from Appendix A)

SASC ACTIONS BY SUBCATEGORY;
FY 1968 - FY 1974


Figure 3



SASC PROGRAMMATIC AND FISCAL TRENDS;

FY 1968 - FY 1974

Figure 4



1
The second peculiar characteristic is directly related to the first. The overall trend of Programmatic activity is one of a steadily increasing nature. This could well be a reflection of a growing interest and concern, on the part of the SASC, with the structure of defense policy and programs. Further, this trend might well be an indication of future motivation and behavior that can be expected.

Table IV reflects Fiscal and Programmatic trends as expressed in absolute dollar totals. The breakdown includes the absolute amount, by fiscal year, of all actions coded F and P in Appendix A. Figure 5 is a graphical representation of the same information.

Of major significance is the fact that in each fiscal year the number of Programmatic actions was either less than those coded Fiscal or at least very nearly equal. However, the absolute dollar amounts of the actions involved differed significantly. For example, in FY 1971 there were 27 Fiscal actions which involved an absolute amount of \$985.8 million. During the same period there were only nine Programmatic actions coded but the dollar total addressed was \$2.3 billion. Hence, although the number of Fiscal actions exceeded those of a Programmatic nature by a factor of 3, the absolute value of the Fiscal actions was 60 per cent less.

The above findings suggest that, although there are a greater overall number of Fiscal actions initiated by the SASC, the greatest effect, or at least potential effect,

TABLE IV

FISCAL VS. PROGRAMMATIC ACTIONS IN ABSOLUTE DOLLARS

<u>FY</u>	<u>FISCAL (NO. ACTIONS)</u>	<u>PROGRAMMATIC (NO. ACTIONS)</u>
1968	0 --	301.1 (1)
1969	83.0 (2)	262.1 (3)
1970	593.9 (8)	385.2 (7)
1971	985.8 (27)	2,313.9 (9)
1972	749.1 (9)	1,429.7 (10)
1973	880.5 (13)	2,482.9 (11)
1974	1,292.9 (29)	3,854.1 (16)


NOTE: Table reflects Absolute Dollar Amounts of actions coded
 Fiscal (F) and Programmatic (P) by Fiscal Year in
 Appendix A, (\$ X Millions).

ABSOLUTE DOLLAR TOTALS OF ACTIONS:

FISCAL VS. PROGRAMMATIC

FY 1963 - FY 1974

Figure 5



comes through Programmatic activity. These findings in themselves should not present any surprise as the actions involving activity in defense policy areas should logically be coincident with programs of a strategic or tactical nature. It is in these areas that are found the weapons programs which account for the major development and procurement expenditures, (i.e. F-14, F-15, B-1, CVN, etc). The findings do suggest however that the trend in SASC activity is apparently towards more involvement with the conduct and control of these systems.

2. Overall Trend of SASC Activity


A direct adjunct to the Fiscal and Programmatic question is an examination of the overall level of activity involving the SASC. Figure 6 reveals the trend of activity during the period examined and suggests that the committee has assumed an increasingly active posture in the authorizations process. The annual level of activity, as expressed in total actions increased from a single major effort in FY 1968 (the FDL debate) to 52 actions in FY 1974. This trend, when taken with the findings above, tends to support the thesis that the SASC is no longer a "rubber-stamp" for administration requests.

3. SASC Role in Authorization Process

In order to gain an appreciation for the liberal (i.e. change-oriented) or critical role played by the SASC in the authorization process, the administration request, House authorization, and SASC recommended authorization

SASC TOTAL ACTIONS;
FY 1968 - FY 1974

Figure 6



amounts were compared for the period examined. Table V reflects the authorization amounts for each of the above areas and Figure 7 graphically details the findings.⁴ The budget authority used in Table V and Figure 7 were taken from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for the fiscal years involved.

During the period examined the average change from the administration request, as passed by the House, was -1.25%. In contrast the same average, when applied to SASC recommendations, was -5.2%. (The averages do not include FY 1973 because of the controversial Southeast Asia Amendment.) These averages, coupled with the overall trend toward larger reductions, tend to reflect a more critical, change-oriented SASC.

This finding was further substantiated by a brief review of the House Committee on Armed Services Reports. These Reports reflect an increasing concern for cost-effective management of the major programs but lack to some degree, the lengthy discussion on Programmatic aspects found in the SASC Reports.

⁴ It should be noted that the amounts involved in these presentations will differ from totals in Appendix A, and the derivative tables and figures. This is due to the omission of such aspects of the Reports as ABM funding, financing charges, carry-over funding and in FY 1973 the Southeast Asia amendment.

TABLE V

PROCUREMENT BUDGETARY ACTION, FY 1968 - FY 1974


(\$ X BILLION)

FY	Admin Request	Final Auth.	(% Δ)	House Authorized (% Δ from Admin)	SASC Auth. (% Δ from Admin)	SASC Auth. Recommended (% Δ from House/Admin)	Senate Passed Authorization	(% Δ from SASC)
1968	\$13.78 B	\$13.86	(+.01)	\$14.13 (+.03)	\$13.48	(-.05 /-.02)	\$13.48	(0)
1969	\$14.37 B	\$13.83	(-.0374)	\$13.76 (-.04)	\$14.13	(+.03 /-.02)	\$14.13	(0)
1970	\$13.74 B	\$13.41	(-.02)	\$13.93 (+.02)	\$12.88	(-.08 /-.06)	\$12.88	(0)
1971	\$12.87 B	\$12.49	(-.03)	\$12.97 (+.01)	\$11.89	(-.08 /-.08)	\$11.89	(0)
1972	\$14.05 B	\$13.41	(-.05)	\$13.11 (-.07)	\$13.30	(+.015/-.05)	\$13.31	(+.001)
1973	\$14.49 B	\$12.43	(-.14)	\$12.94 (-.11)	\$12.89	(-.07 /-.17)	\$12.09	(0)
1974	\$13.40	\$13.10	(-.02)	\$13.07 (-.025)	\$12.40	(-.05 /-.08)	\$12.89	(+.04)
Avg. Reduction SASC = .057								

(Extracted from CQ Almanac, 1967-1973 and Senate Reports, FY 1968-1974.)

PERCENTAGE OF CHANGE RECOMMENDED BY
SASC AND HOUSE TO REQUESTED
PROCUREMENT NOA: FY 1968 - FY 1974

Figure 7



VI. CONCLUSIONS

A. CONCEPT EVALUATION

The author feels that the above analysis adequately demonstrates the viability and validity of Content Analysis as a technique for examining congressional behavior. Based on the results above, it appears that the method is feasible for operational application in addition to being useful in an academic sense. Specifically, the approach could prove useful as an augmenting source of information available to the Congressional Liaison Offices of the service components. The Reports and Hearings are readily available to these offices and after analysis could provide material indicating the mood and desires of the Congress. The obtained results might then be used, in conjunction with other sources, to further educate and prepare the Program Manager for committee briefings.

The Content Analysis methodology is not original, however this effort does represent a "first-cut" at applying the technique to specific committee behavior. As is the case with any similar research, the initial application is by no means definitive. Successive iterations should remove biases that might be inadvertent products of a single effort and at the same time serve to further strengthen and refine the operational categories.

B. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Based on the research effort herein completed, it does appear that the published Reports of the military committees provide a valuable source of information which accurately reflects Congress' motivations. The use of these Reports would seem to provide a source of reference which activities such as the Legislative Liaison Offices within the Navy, or their inter-service counterparts, could use in preparing the Program Managers for congressional hearings.

There is evidence that Program Managers, as a group, do not understand the desires or mechanics of the committees before which they must testify. It has been shown above that, at least within the SASC, there is an environment of stability, an increased augmentation of staff personnel and a growing expertise within specific subcommittees. These factors make it essential that the service components understand the overall budgetary process within Congress and anticipate the desires and orientation of the specific committees which challenge the viability of defense programs and strategies.

The need for more DOD-directed efforts at improving the overall weapons acquisition process is obvious. Even the most cursory examination of recorded congressional activity cannot help but support this fact. Examples of committee concern with cost-growth and management of weapons programs are manifest. Actions such as the \$100 million reduction recommended by the SASC in FY 1974 [Ref. 29, p. 26], and the

lengthy discussion directed toward Navy Shipbuilding problems during FY 1972 [Ref. 27, p. 27] are two examples of the dissatisfaction and frustration associated with the acquisition process. These actions, when viewed in relation to the increased Programmatic orientation and large budgetary actions involved, demand an increased effort on the part of the services to interact in a more effective manner with Congress.

Interactions with the major defense committees must provide honest, accurate and realistic appraisals of program merit and progress if the required funding is to be granted. This appears to be the only answer to avoiding punitive fiscal actions such as the B-1 reduction cited above. Control of budgetary authority by the SASC and Congress is a necessary check in our political system. As such, program requests and justifications must represent the true requirements of National Defense.

C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

As mentioned above, this analysis represents a first attempt to relate the method of Content Analysis to specific committee behavior. An equally important area, and also one that has a near-void of research efforts, is that of committee staff behavior and influence. This was alluded to above but, as this thesis was concerned with explicit activity, the staff was purposely avoided. It is not unreasonable to assume, however, that the span of congressional involvement

has necessitated a greater reliance on staff expertise and resulted in a more powerful influence on the part of the staffs viz-a-viz congressional oversight.

APPENDIX A

RECORDED DECISIONS FOR ANALYSIS: FY 1968 - FY 1974

No.	FY	Service /	Equipment /	Action (\$ X M)	Ref. Page	Category	
						Original	Final
1.	68	N	FDL	-301.1M	5,6	FP	P
2.	69	N	F-111B	-225.8M	2,3	DEV	P
3.	69	N	Missiles	- 31.0M	2	FI	F
4.	69	N	EA-6B	RA 22.8M	4	TP	P
5.	69	N	DXGN	RA 52.0M	5	CE	F
6.	69	N	SSN	+ 13.5M	5,6	SP	P
7.	70	A	Mohawk	- 28.1M	13	FI	F
8.	70	A	Cheyenne	-429.0M	6	DOD	OTHER
9.	70	N	A-7E	-104.0M	3,4,18	CE	F
10.	70	N	CH-46E	- 18.0M	17	FI	F
11.	70	AF	A-7D/F-4E	-374.7/+374.7	3,4	CE	F
12.	70	AF	A-37B	- 22.5M	20	CE	F
13.	70	AF	T-X	- 21.5M	20	FI	F
14.	70	AF	Acft Mod.	- 40.0M	20	DOD	OTHER
15.	70	AF	Acft Spares	- 50.0M	20	DEV	P
16.	70	A	Tow Missile	- 14.0M	21,22	DOD	OTHER
17.	70	A	Hawk Missile	- 9.2M	22	DEV	P
18.	70	A	Interragator	- 8.5M	22	DEV	P
19.	70	A	Launcher	- 3.5M	22	DEV	P
20.	70	AF	SRAM	- 20.4M	25	DOD	OTHER
21.	70	N	SSN	+123.5M	7,8	SP	P
22.	70	N	FDL	-186.7M	36	FP	P
23.	70	A	Tracked Veh/ Equipt.	- 5.1M	38	FI	F
24.	70	A	M60A1 Tank	- 20.0M	40	CE	F
25.	70	A	Range Finder	- 3.8M	40	DEV	P
26.	71	A	Acft	- 2.4M	32	FI	F
27.	71	N	Acft	- 35.5M	36	FI	F
28.	71	AF	Acft	- 59.4M	40	FI	F

No.	FY	Service /	Equipment /	Action (\$ X M)	Ref. Page	Category	
						Original	Final
29.	71	A	Missiles	- 8.0M	45	FI	F
30.	71	N	Missiles	- 7.5M	48	FI	F
31.	71	AF	Missiles	- 14.0M	54	FI	F
32.	71	N	Ship Bldg/Conv.	-150.0M	60	FI	F
33.	71	A	Tracked Veh.	- 1.0M	63	FI	F
34.	71	A	Other Weapons	- 1.0M	68	FI	F
35.	71	AF	C-5A	RA622.2M	16-18	FM	P
36.	71	A	M60A1 Tank	- 10.9M	23	CE	F
37.	71	A	M60A1E2	- 12.1M	23	DEV	P
38.	71	A	MBT-70	RA 77.0M	24	DOD	OTHER
39.	71	AF	A-X	RA 27.9M	24	PM	F
40.	71	A	Cheyenne	- 17.6M	25	DEV	P
41.	71	A	Adv. Helo	- 4.0M	25	FI	F
42.	71	A	Tow Missile	RA111.2M	26	TP	P
43.	71	AF	F-15	RA370.0M	26	FM	P
44.	71	N	F-14	- 5.2M	27	PM	F
45.	71	N	F-14	RA977.0M	27	TP	P
46.	71	AF	F-111D	- 6.4M	27,28	IR	F
47.	71	AF	B-1	- 50.0M	29	FI	F
48.	71	N	S-3A	- 79.0M	33	IR	F
49.	71	AF	Int'l Fighter	- 30.0M	37	FI	F
50.	71	A	Hawk Missile	- 37.0M	44	DEV	P
51.	71	A	Lance	RA 33.8M	44	CE	F
52.	71	N	Sparrow	- 6.7M	46	PM	F
53.	71	MC	Hawk	- 14.8M	49	DEV	P
54.	71	AF	Maverick	+ 3.1M	51,52	PM	F
55.	71	AF	Falcon	- 15.0M	52	PM	F
56.	71	N	CVAN	-152.0M	56	DEV	P
57.	71	N	SSN	-188.5M	56	FI	F
58.	71	N	Sub Tender	-102.0M	56	FI	F
59.	71	N	Dest Tender	-103.0M	56	FI	F
60.	71	N	Rescue Ship	- 7.5M	56	FI	F
61.	71	N	LC	- 10.0M	56	FI	F

No.	FY	Service	Equipment	Action (\$ X M)	Ref. Page	Category	
						Original	Final
62.	71	N	Service Craft	- 24.0M	56	FI	F
63.	71	MC	LVTP-7	- 1.3M	64	DOD	OTHER
64.	72	AF	F-111	RA485.7M	29	PM	F
65.	72	AF	C-5	- 75.8M	29,30	PM	F
66.	72	N	F-14	+801.6M	31	TP	P
67.	72	AF	B-1	RA370.3M	34	SP	P
68.	72	AF	SCAD	RA 10.0M	35	SP	P
69.	72	A	MBT-70	RA 62.8M	37	TP	P
70.	72	AF	A-X	RA 47.0M	38	TP	P
71.	72	MC	AV-8A	+ 23.7M	40	FP	P
72.	72	A	Cheyenne	- 13.2M	40	DEV	P
73.	72	A	Acft	- 17.0M	43	FI	F
74.	72	N	EA-6B	- 50.6M	46	PM	F
75.	72	N	P3C	- 51.0M	47	PM	F
76.	72	N	C-9	+ 23.1M	47	CE	F
77.	72	N	CT-39	- 3.8M	48	FI	F
78.	72	N	Acft Mod.	- 1.3M	48	PM	F
79.	72	AF	C130E	- 40.8M	53	FI	F
80.	72	N	Sparrow	+ 2.6M	59	TP	P
81.	72	AF	Falcon	- 5.5M	64	DOD	OTHER
82.	72	AF	Minuteman	- 61.0M	64	DOD	OTHER
83.	72	N	SSN	+ 22.5M	68	SP	P
84.	72	N	AS	- 76.0M	69	DEV	P
85.	72	N	AOR	- 56.5M	69	DOD	OTHER
86.	72	N	ATS	- 52.6M	69	DOD	OTHER
87.	72	N	Escalation	-155.7M	69	DOD	OTHER
88.	73	N	F-14	RA570.1M	14-19	PM	F
89.	73	AF	C-5A	-100.0M	21	FI	F
90.	73	AF	AABNCP	-136.8M	22	DEV	P
91.	73	AF	F-15	RA910.0M	23	FM	P
92.	73	N	CVN-70	RA299.0M	26	FM	P
93.	73	N	Trident	- 20.0M	27	DOD	OTHER
94.	73	AF	B-1	RA444.5M	33	SP	P

No.	FY	Service / Equipment / Action			Ref. Page	Category	
		(\$ X M)				Original	Final
95.	73	AF	A-X	RA 48.1M	35	PM	F
96.	73	A	Cheyenne	- 58.6M	36	DEV	P
97.	73	MC	AV-8A	-133.1M	36	DEV	P
98.	73	A	U-21	- 12.7M	36	PM	F
99.	73	N	CT-39	- 7.9M	37	PM	F
100.	73	AF	CXX	- 8.4M	37	PM	F
101.	73	AF	AWACS	-309.9M	38	DEV	P
102.	73	AF	OTH-B	RA 4.4M	39	SP	P
103.	73	A	SAM-D	RA171.4M	40	TP	P
104.	73	A	Vulcan	- 15.2M	40,48	DEV	P
105.	73	N	S-3A	- 10.2M	46	PM	F
106.	73	N	Acft Mods.	- 20.0M	40	PM	F
107.	73	AF	F-5E	- 2.3M	51	FI	F
108.	73	AF	Acft Mods.	- 40.0M	40	PM	F
109.	73	AF	Minuteman	- 27.0M	63	PM	F
110.	73	N	DD963	-363.0M	67	DOD	OTHER
111.	73	N	SCS	- 10.0M	68	DEV	P
112.	73	N	ATS	- 26.1M	68	FI	F
113.	73	MC	LVTE-7	- 7.7M	75	PM	F
114.	74	N	F-14	-505.4M	13-15	PM	F
115.	74	AF	F-15	RA1,147.1M	15	FM	P
116.	74	N	CVN-70	RA657.0M	17	FM	P
117.	74	MC	AV-8A	- 6.0M	18	CE	F
118.	74	A	Adv Helo	- 3.5M	18	FI	F
119.	74	AF	A-10	- 30.0M	20	DEV	P
120.	74	ANG	A-7D	RA 70.1M	21	FM	P
121.	74	AF	C-5A	- 5.9M	22	DOD	OTHER
122.	74	A	Util Acft	- 12.2M	22	FI	F
123.	74	AF	Util Acft	- 9.6M	22	FI	F
124.	74	N	Sidewinder	- 1.5M	23	DEV	P
125.	74	AF	Laser Guided Missiles	- 8.0M	23	CE	F
126.	74	N	Bulldog	+ 12.5M	24	CE	F
127.	74	A	Hellfire	+ 11.2M	24	CE	F

No.	FY	Service / Equipment / Action			Ref. Page	Category	
		(\$ X M)				Original	Final
128.	74	AF	B-1	-100.0M	25	PM	F
129.	74	N	T2C	- 26.1M	26	CE	F
130.	74	AF	SCAD	- 72.2M	27	DOD	OTHER
131.	74	N	SCM	- 15.2M	27	PM	F
132.	74	A	LADS	- 42.4M	34	SP	P
133.	74	N	CIWS	- 8.0M	83	DEV	P
134.	74	N	MK-22	- 0.8M	83	DOD	OTHER
135.	74	A	SAM-D	RA194.2M	35	SP	P
136.	74	N	Trident	RA 1,527.4M	37	SP	P
137.	74	AF	AWACS	- 42.0M	40	DOD	OTHER
138.	74	N	EA-6B	- 15.0M	48	FI	F
139.	74	N	A7E	- 9.1M	48	DEV	P
140.	74	N	A7E	- 5.7M	48	CE	F
141.	74	AF	F-5A	- 41.0M	52	FI	F
142.	74	AF	F-111	+158.8M	52	PM	F
143.	74	AF	T-41D	- 0.1M	53	DOD	OTHER
144.	74	AF	UH-1H	- 40.2M	53	FI	F
145.	74	AF	Acft Mods.	- 35.5M	53	PM	F
146.	74	AF	Acft Spares	- 9.3M	54	DOD	OTHER
147.	74	AF	GSE	- 5.5M	54	DOD	OTHER
148.	74	A	Lance Missile	- 4.7M	57	FI	F
149.	74	A	Pershing	- 4.5M	57	FI	F
150.	74	A	ADCCS	- 4.3M	58	DEV	P
151.	74	AF	Minuteman	- 45.8M	66	PM	F
152.	74	AF	SRAM	- 5.6M	66	FI	F
153.	74	AF	Maverick	- 9.9M	66	FI	F
154.	74	AF	Shrike	- 2.2M	66	FI	F
155.	74	N	SCS	- 29.3M	70	DEV	P
156.	74	N	SSBN	-113.6M	71	DEV	P
157.	74	N	DLG	- 35.6M	71	FI	F
158.	74	N	Escalation	- 94.6M	71	FI	F
159.	74	A	M60A1 Tank	- 41.4M	74	PM	F
160.	74	N	MK-48	- 5.0M	78	DEV	P

No.	FY	Service / Equipment		Action (\$ X M)	Ref. Page	Category	
						Original	Final
161.	74	N	Captor	- 11.6M	78	DEV	P
162.	74	A	XM198	- 3.5M	80	DEV	P
163.	74	A	M60	- 4.5M	80	FI	F
164.	74	A	M219	- 1.3M	80	FI	F
165.	74	A	M16	- 3.1M	80	FI	F

Key to abbreviations

+ = add-on

- = reduction or deletion

RA = recommend approval as requested

Ref. = appropriate page of Senate Report for fiscal year indicated.

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